如果你也在 怎样代写微观经济学Microeconomics这个学科遇到相关的难题，请随时右上角联系我们的24/7代写客服。微观经济学Microeconomics是主流经济学的一个分支，研究个人和公司在做出有关稀缺资源分配的决策时的行为以及这些个人和公司之间的互动。微观经济学侧重于研究单个市场、部门或行业，而不是宏观经济学所研究的整个国民经济。
微观经济学Microeconomics的一个目标是分析在商品和服务之间建立相对价格的市场机制，并在各种用途之间分配有限资源。微观经济学显示了自由市场导致理想分配的条件。它还分析了市场失灵，即市场未能产生有效的结果。微观经济学关注公司和个人，而宏观经济学则关注经济活动的总和，处理增长、通货膨胀和失业问题以及与这些问题有关的国家政策。微观经济学还处理经济政策（如改变税收水平）对微观经济行为的影响，从而对经济的上述方面产生影响。特别是在卢卡斯批判之后，现代宏观经济理论大多建立在微观基础上，即基于微观层面行为的基本假设。
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经济代写|微观经济学作业代写Microeconomics代考|Background and problems
Standard neoclassical theory identifies firms with production functions. Production possibilities are perfectly known and the production function is the efficiency frontier which separates known from unknown techniques. In this framework technological change is a sort of magic by which “certain production possibilities are suddenly extracted from the Unknown and added to the Known. There is ordinarily no analysis as to why particular possibilities rather than others should be thus discovered” (Winter, 1968). The reduction to production functions prevents any serious analysis of the role of firms as fundamental loci where productive technical knowledge is generated, stored, socialized, transmitted and, especially, modified and, therefore, as major sources of technological changes (Schumpeter, 1955). Because it puts a particular emphasis on technological, organizational and, in general, economic change, evolutionary theory assigns a central position to theorizing about firms and their internal mechanisms which generate such changes (Nelson-Winter, 1982).
Also neoclassical theory has recently questioned and overcome the most radical standard assumptions and developed more sophisticated theories which open the firm’s black box. Agency theory has studied ownermanager-worker contractual relations acknowledging that firms are made of a multiplicity of agents with heterogeneous objectives and asymmetric information and that their actions must be guided by appropriate incentives
in order to make them comply with the organizational objectives. Transaction costs economics on the other hand has moved from the recognition of bounded rationality and contract incompleteness and analyzed firms as coordination devices alternative to and complementary with the market.
Evolutionary economics acknowledges the importance of information asymmetries in explaining organizations and their structure, and certainly shares with transaction costs economics the emphasis on bounded rationality, but stresses the cognitive aspect of organizations which is mostly neglected by those theories. Firms are there first of all to do things. They produce, store, transmit, socialize and modify the knowledge which is necessary to produce (useful) things (Winter, 1982). Such knowledge cannot normally be detained by a single individual, nor can it be normally put together by simple market coordination, but must be “organized”. Market mechanisms do not in fact convey enough information and knowledge to manage complex distributed knowledge, moreover an important part of the relevant knowledge is tacit and requires direct interaction in order to be apprehended, transmitted and shared.
Evolutionary theory is thus trying to develop theories and models based upon knowledge, cognition and learning, the latter seen not simply as information processing but as structural modification of cognitive representations, action repertoires and organizational architectures, in other words as genuine technological and organizational innovation.
Evolutionary theory in general, and the part concerned with organizations in particular, strongly believes in bounded rationality, usually in a rather strong version thereof. In this and other respects evolutionary theory has strong connections with the behavioural theory of the firm (MarchSimon, 1958, Cyert-March, 1963). Agents and organizations face problems they only partly understand and have to build representations of such problems and problem-solving procedures which are inevitably imperfect and continuously subject to revision through learning. An important part of problem-solving is the activity of subproblem decomposition (Simon, 1981): large, complex and new problems have to be decomposed into smaller, more manageable and familiar ones. In organizations problem decomposition maps into division of labour and modularization of artifacts (Baldwin-Clark, 2000) and is usually a precondition for the formation of new markets. Most of the time in fact it is the processes of division of labour, standardization and modularization within organization which creates new technological interfaces whose coordination can then possibly be transferred to the market.
经济代写|微观经济学作业代写Microeconomics代考|Canonical principles
In standard neoclassical theory agents behave according to the principles of utility maximization and coordination among them can only be achieved by putting into place the appropriate monetary rewards. This is normally done by market forces, but whenever the latter cannot operate optimally, alternative (second-best) contractual arrangements are devised within organizations. In evolutionary theory instead intra-organizational coordination is mainly carried out by routines (Nelson-Winter, 1982). According to Cohen et al.: “A routine is an executable capability for repeated performance in some context that has been learned by an organization in response to selective pressure” (Cohen et al., 1996).
The first key term, capability, is defined as the capacity to generate an action pattern that has been stored in localized or distributed form within the organization. As Nelson and Winter suggested, this capacity entails the ability to know what action pattern to perform and when to perform it. This implies that individual agency within organizations is not only guided by the logic of consequence of utility maximization but also, and mainly, by the logic of appropriateness (March, 1994), according to which members of the organization act according to rules they believe are appropriate in their role and given a situation they recognize as familiar.
This also implies that organizational members must be able to receive and interpret inputs generated, within a specific context, both by humans and non-human devices. Inputs may include, for example, formal orders from a superior, informal suggestions, descriptions of the situation, the activation of another action pattern by other members, a particular date on the calendar or a particular time on the clock (Nelson-Winter, 1982). While the ability to receive inputs could be independent of the specific organizational context, the ability to recognize and interpret messages and inputs – as well as to generate appropriate messages and input – and to recall the appropriate pattern of action, is part of the knowledge and problem-solving repertoire that the single member learn within the organization. This view of routines as stored and shared problem-solving skills is commonly, and fruitfully, adopted in both theoretical and empirical research on the origin, development and change of organizational capabilities.
At the same time, growing effort has gone also into the formal representation of processes of search, recombination, reinforcement of sequence of elementary operations yielding particular problem-solving procedures. However, routines emerge and are implemented in organizations com-posed of a plurality of individuals who might have conflicting interests. Certainly, a firm can be considered as a hierarchy of routines. This hierarchy, however, also entails a mechanism of exercise of authority and governance of the admissible behaviours by which individual members can pursue their interests. This is indeed acknowledged by Nelson who suggest that routines can be seen also as “truces” amongst potentially conflicting interests, but this complementary nature of routines has been so far relatively neglected in that literature which explicitly builds upon evolutionary ideas.
Finally, as concerns methodology, evolutionary modelling about organizations has received a great impetus from the development of agent-based simulation techniques, which are at the heart of all the models presented in this chapter. Computer simulations are very useful in at least two respects: they allow both for the construction of “behaviourally rich” models and for the study of explicit mechanisms of interaction among (heterogeneous) agents.
微观经济学代写
经济代写|微观经济学作业代写MICROECONOMICS代考|BACKGROUND AND PROBLEMS
标准的新古典理论确定了具有生产函数的公司。生产可能性是完全已知的，生产函数是区分已知技术和未知技术的效率边界。在这个框架中，技术变革是一种魔法，通过它“某些生产可能性突然从未知中提取并添加到已知中。通常没有分析为什么应该发现特定的可能性而不是其他的可能性”在一世n吨和r,1968. 生产函数的缩减阻止了对公司作为生产技术知识产生、存储、社会化、传播，特别是修改的基本场所的作用进行任何认真的分析，因此，作为技术变革的主要来源小号CH在米p和吨和r,1955. 因为它特别强调技术、组织和总体上的经济变化，进化理论将中心位置分配给关于公司及其产生这种变化的内部机制的理论化ñ和ls这n−在一世n吨和r,1982.
新古典理论最近也质疑并克服了最激进的标准假设，并发展了更复杂的理论，打开了公司的黑匣子。代理理论研究了所有者-经理-工人的合同关系，承认公司是由具有异质目标和不对称信息的众多代理人组成的，他们的行动必须以适当的激励为指导
以使他们符合组织目标。另一方面，交易成本经济学已经从对有限理性和合同不完备性的认识转变为将公司分析为替代市场和与市场互补的协调工具。
进化经济学承认信息不对称在解释组织及其结构方面的重要性，当然与交易成本经济学一样强调有限理性，但强调组织的认知方面，而这些理论大多被这些理论所忽视。公司首先在那里做事。他们生产、存储、传播、社会化和修改生产所需的知识在s和F在l事物在一世n吨和r,1982. 这种知识通常不能被一个人所掌握，也不能通过简单的市场协调来拼凑起来，而必须“组织起来”。市场机制实际上并没有传递足够的信息和知识来管理复杂的分布式知识，而且相关知识的重要部分是默认的，需要直接交互才能被理解、传递和共享。
因此，进化论试图发展基于知识、认知和学习的理论和模型，后者不仅被视为信息处理，而且被视为认知表征、行动库和组织架构的结构修改，换句话说，是真正的技术和组织创新。
一般来说，进化论，特别是与组织有关的部分，强烈相信有限理性，通常是一个相当强大的版本。在这方面和其他方面，进化理论与公司的行为理论有着密切的联系米一种rCH小号一世米这n,1958,C是和r吨−米一种rCH,1963. 代理人和组织面临着他们只部分理解的问题，并且必须构建这些问题的表示和解决问题的程序，这些问题不可避免地是不完美的，并且通过学习不断地受到修正。解决问题的一个重要部分是子问题分解的活动小号一世米这n,1981：大的、复杂的和新的问题必须分解成更小、更易于管理和熟悉的问题。在组织中，问题分解映射为分工和工件的模块化乙一种ld在一世n−Cl一种rķ,2000并且通常是形成新市场的先决条件。事实上，大多数情况下，组织内的分工、标准化和模块化过程创造了新的技术接口，其协调可能会转移到市场上。
经济代写|微观经济学作业代写MICROECONOMICS代考|CANONICAL PRINCIPLES
在标准的新古典理论中，代理人根据效用最大化的原则行事，他们之间的协调只能通过适当的金钱奖励来实现。这通常由市场力量完成，但当后者无法以最佳方式运作时，替代方案s和C这nd−b和s吨合同安排是在组织内部设计的。在进化论中，组织内的协调主要是通过例行公事来进行的ñ和ls这n−在一世n吨和r,1982. 根据 Cohen 等人的说法：“例行程序是一种可执行的能力，可以在某些情况下重复执行，这是组织为应对选择压力而学会的”C这H和n和吨一种l.,1996.
第一个关键术语，能力，被定义为生成行动模式的能力，该行动模式已经以本地化或分布式形式存储在组织内。正如 Nelson 和 Winter 所建议的那样，这种能力需要知道要执行什么动作模式以及何时执行它的能力。这意味着组织内的个体代理不仅受效用最大化后果逻辑的指导，而且主要受适当性逻辑的指导。米一种rCH,1994，根据这些规则，组织成员根据他们认为适合其角色的规则以及他们认为熟悉的情况行事。
这也意味着组织成员必须能够接收和解释在特定环境中由人类和非人类设备生成的输入。输入可能包括，例如，来自上级的正式命令、非正式建议、情况描述、其他成员激活另一种行动模式、日历上的特定日期或时钟上的特定时间ñ和ls这n−在一世n吨和r,1982. 虽然接收输入的能力可以独立于特定的组织环境，但识别和解释信息和输入的能力——以及产生适当的信息和输入——以及回忆适当的行动模式的能力，是知识和单个成员在组织内学习的解决问题的技巧。这种将常规视为存储和共享的解决问题的技能的观点，在关于组织能力的起源、发展和变化的理论和实证研究中普遍并富有成效。
与此同时，越来越多的努力也投入到搜索、重组、强化基本操作序列的过程的形式表示上，从而产生特定的问题解决程序。然而，惯例出现并在由可能具有冲突利益的多个个人组成的组织中实施。当然，公司可以被认为是例行程序的层次结构。然而，这种等级制度也需要一种行使权力的机制，并对允许的行为进行治理，个人成员可以通过这种机制追求自己的利益。尼尔森确实承认了这一点，他认为常规也可以被视为潜在利益冲突之间的“休战”，
最后，就方法论而言，关于组织的进化建模从基于代理的模拟技术的发展中获得了巨大的推动力，这是本章介绍的所有模型的核心。计算机模拟至少在两个方面非常有用：它们既可以构建“行为丰富”的模型，也可以研究相互作用的显式机制。H和吨和r这G和n和这在s代理。
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